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As the stockholder's suit is nowadays a standard remedy, it might be
thought that the outlines of its underlying theory were of easy tracing.
Yet even to-day we hear expressions from high places that are hard to
reconcile. An eminent judge in the New Jersey chancery describes the
object of the suit as "the specific performance of a continuing contract
in writing, consisting of a certificate of capital stock."'- But that is
hardly consistent with the well-recognized principle that, generally
speaking, the benefits of the suit are taken by the corporation and only
indirectly by the person who files the bill, although the corporation is
not even a co-plaintiff, but is to be found among the defendants.
Indeed, a standard text writer regrets this very circumstance, opining
that the innocent shareholders are disheartened, and the guilty encour-
aged, because of the rule that "the results of even a successful suit
belong to the corporation, and not to the stockholders who sue."2  But
whether this is the inevitable result of the plaintiff's success depends
upon what it is that we call a stockholder's suit; for it is quite possible
to find instances where the plaintiff, by obtaining direct relief, demon-
strated that the corporation was not of necessity the beneficiary of his
action.
Plainly, therefore, we must be careful in our use of the term under
discussion. Like other definitions, it describes ; but to be of value it
must define. It invokes by its mention an immense body of law, but
we will not be on our way to a clear understanding unless we take our
bearings. And, like other things of our common law, the subject
cannot properly be discussed entirely from the standpoint of procedure.
Back of that, and informing it, are substantive thoughts which it is our
duty to apprehend. But, because ultimate ideas are simple in their
nature, to get a proper view of them we must deal with elementary
rules on the way.
The first of these rules has to do with the derivative nature of the
stockholder's suit. For, as we have already noted, the plaintiff does
not sue in his own right, but in that of the corporation. To it should
go the fruits of the recovery, and it is erroneous for the decree to allow
'Pitney, V. C., in Beling v. Aterican Tobacco Co. (igo7) 72 N. J. Eq. 32, 65
At. 725.
23 Cook, Corporations (7th ed. I913) sec. 643.
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the stockholder anything personally.3 The cause of action is the asset
of the corporation; and therefore no suit can be brought unless the
plaintiff shows that he has asked the directors of the corporation to sue
in the company's name, and they have refused, or that it would be futile
to make such a request, because of their collusion with the wrongdoer.
4
The same reasoning makes the courts let a stockholder defend a suit
against the corporation, if he can show that the directors, by reason of
their affiliation with the plaintiff, are not to be trusted to defend the
case properly.5 Indeed, a judgment already obtained will be opened up
'Landis v. Sea Isle Hotel Co. (1896) 53 N. J. Eq. 654, 33 At. 964; Pollitz v.
Wabash R. R. (9,5, ist Dept.) 167 App. Div. 669, 152 N. Y. Supp. 803, and cases
there cited. "Such being the character of these allegations, the rule is so well
settled as to require no citation of authorities that under any ordinary circum-
stances the fraud of the officers or managers of a corporation whereby its assets
are misappropriated must be redressed by an action brought by the corporation to
whom the assets belonged or by a stockholder derivatively in behalf of the corpora-
tion." Brock v. Poor (1915) 216 N. Y. 387, 396, IIi N. E. 229, 232. "A stock-
holder, as such, does not have a legal or equitable estate in the corporate property;
his only right of property is to a proportionate share of the profits of the business
while the company is in operation, and to a proportionate share of the net assets
on its dissolution. Unauthorized dealing with the franchises or funds of the
corporation directly injure it as a legal entity; it is the franchises of the corpora-
tion which are to be misused, the funds of the corporation which are to be misap-
propriated, and the corporation, therefore, is the party to be injured and should
itself seek redress." Green, V. C., in Willoughby v. Chicago Jcn. Rys. Co. (1892)
50 N. J. Eq. 656, 664, 25 At. 277, 280. The mischief of a contrary suggestion,
recently made (Harris v. Rogers [1919, 4th Dept.] i9o App. Div. 2o8, I79 N. Y.
Supp. 799) was pointed out in later litigation affecting the same subject. Harris v.
Pearsall (1921, Sup. Ct.) 116 Misc. 366.
'Hawes v. Oakland (iS8i) 104 U. S. 450. It is not necessary to make demand
of the stockholders, because such a plebiscite would not of necessity govern the
action of the Board, for even the majority cannot control the Board during its
term of office. See Matter of Kohler (1921) 231 N. Y. 353, 132 N. E. 114. The
case might be different, of course, if the demand were coincident with the election
of a new board. See Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont (1912) 206 N. Y. 7,
I7, 99 N. E. 138; Del. & Hudson Co. v. Albany, etc. R. R. (199o) 213 U. S. 435,
29 Sup. Ct. 540. "The cause of action belonged to the corporation; but the
plaintiff's institution of the suit is justified in law by the alleged futility of a
demand that the plaintiff sue. The effect of the plaintiff's recovering a judgment
upon his demand would be to restore the moneys and property misappropriated by
McClanahan to the possession of the corporation. (Sage v. Culver, 147 N. Y.
241; Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 181 ib. 2.)" McCrea v. Robert-
son (9o8) 192 N. Y. i5o, i54, 84 N. E. 96o, 96I.
5 Shively v. Eureka Co. (igoo) 129 Calif. 293, 61 Pac. 939; Re Eureka Anthra-
cite Coal Co. (1912, W. D. Ark.) 197 Fed. 216; Dickerman v. Northern
Trust Co. (9oo) 176 U. S. i8i, 20 Sup. Ct. .31I; Blake v. Blake & Knowles
(1915) 84 N. J. Eq. 363, 94 At. 419; Fitzwater v. Nat. Bank of Seneca (19oo)
62 Kan. 163, 61 Pac. 684; Ogden v. Gilt Edge Consol. Mines Co. (1915, C. C. A.
8th) 225 Fed. 723. See also Bronson v. LaCrosse & Milwaukee R. R. (1863,
U. S.) 2 Wall. 283. In some states this right is allowed by statute; e. g. N. Y.
Gen. Corp. Law, Laws, 19o9, ch. 28, sec. 33.
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for defense if the shareholder acts promptly.6 In each instance, there-
fore, what the shareholder does is to protect the corporation.
That being the object of the suit, obviously it should not be compli-
cated with any considerations personal to the shareholder. Thus, if he
is to defend a suit against the company, he must first obtain leave to do
so. As he is not a party to the record, he can do nothing without the
court's leave. Qua shareholder, he cannot appeal from a decree which
has been rendered against the company unless under special circum-
stances7 or remove into the Federal court a suit pending against the
company." It is for that reason that the stockholder can bring no suit
that joins a grievance personal to himself, even to himself as a stock-
holder, with one properly to be asserted by the company.9 And although
the corporation, since it is to receive the proceeds of the recovery, is an
indispensable party to the suit,10 yet the plaintiff cannot turn a personal
action, brought for his own benefit against the directors, into a suit of
this character simply by joining the company as a party defendant. He
must do more than call the roll of the defendants; he must show that
the gravamen of the suit is an injury to the company rather than to
himself.:"
Naturally, the derivative nature of the suit requires that it be brought
in equity. The right which the stockholder seeks as plaintiff, to enforce
is not his; hence no common law court could hear him. It follows that,
even though the company could have recovered in an action at law, the
stockholder who sues in its right must resort to equity in order to
obtain for the unwilling company that to which it may be entitled.'
2
'Equit. Trust Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. R. (192o, D. Colo.) 269 Fed. 987;
Forbes v. M. E. P. & P. R. R. (1872, C. C. W. D. Tex.) 2 Woods, 232, Fed. Case
No. 4926; Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Kansas City, W. & N. W. R. R. (1892,
C. C. D. Kan.) 53 Fed. 182; Levy v. Equit. Trust Co. (ig2i, C. C. A. 8th) 271
Fed. 49; At. Ref. Co. v. Port Lobos Petro. Corp. (1922, D. Del.) 28o Fed. 934.
'State v. Fla. Central R. R. (1876) 15 Fla. 69o. Cf. Peck v. N. Y. & Liverpool
Steamship Co. (1858, N. Y. Super. Ct.) 3 Bosw. 622; Bockes v. Hathorn (1879)
78 N. Y. 222.
'Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge (1893) I1 U. S. 129; McGraw v. Mott (91o,
C. C. A. 4th) 179 Fed. 646; Citizens' Bak v. Union Mining Co. (9oo, C. C. N. D.
Iowa) io6 Fed. 97.
"Brock v. Poor, supra note 3; Ringler v. Jetter (1923, ist Dept.) 206 App. Div.
478. If the point is not raised on demurrer, the plaintiff at least should be
required to elect on the trial. See Brewster v. Hatch (i89o) 122 N. Y. 349, 25
N. E. 505. After judgment, of course, the false joinder cannot constitute a
grievance unless the point has been raised at or prior to the trial. Kreitner v.
Burgweger (1916, 4th Dept) 174 App. Div. 48, i6o N. Y. Supp. 256.
" Porter v. Sabin (1893) 149 U. S. 473, 13 Sup. Ct. ioo8; Brady v. Meenan
(1923, ist Dept.) 2o4 App. Div. 390, 198 N. Y. Supp. 177.
U Converse v. United Shoe Mach. Co. (1911) 209 Mass. 539, 95 N. E. 929.
'Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co. (1905) 181 N. Y. 121, 73 N. E. 562;
Harris v. Pearsall, supra note 3; Jones v. Mo. Edison Electric Co. (i9o6, C. C. A.
8th) 144 Fed. 765, 777; American Seating Co. v. Bullard (1923, C. C. A. 6th)
29o Fed. 896, 9o.
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The equity court, naturally, can draw no line in this regard; and so it
will vindicate, at the stockholder's behest, all corporate rights, legal and
equitable, except where a statute limits enforcement to an action at law.
In that event corporate rights must go without remedy; for, if the
company will not sue to enforce them at law, the shareholder cannot,
in its behalf or otherwise, assert them in equity."3
The other aspect of the stockholder's suit is its representative charac-
ter. Whether, as usually happens, the plaintiff states that he files his
bill for the benefit of the other shareholders, actually it is of interest
to them; and consequently they may become co-plaintiffs for the asking.
There are several results. The decree binds all, whether they actually
have intervened or not.1 4  But prior to decree the suit is in the control
of the plaintiffs for the time being, whether they be original plaintiffs
or intervenors, and they can drop it at will. 5 It does not follow, how-
ever, that a discontinuance would bar a fresh action by other share-
holders. "The right of action is in no sense joint" ;16 and this is illus-
trated by the fact, that, even if the original plaintiff were in no position
to seek the aid of equity by reason of his laches or estoppel, the objec-
tion is removed if another joins in the bill. 7 And so if one or more
of the plaintiffs should part with his stock pendente lite,--that would
dispose of the suit did he stand alone,' 8 but, if there are other plaintiffs
who still have their stock, the bill cannot be dismissed.' 9 The same
reasoning results in an intervening stockholder being allowed to revive
a suit that has abated by reason of the death of the original plaintiff.20
But we must not let the representative character of the suit obscure
"It is hardly necessary to add that situations of this sort are rare; but such a
case actually arose recently. A shareholder endeavored to enforce the corporate
right to sue for treble damages under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, but was
dismissed; the Supreme Court refusing to allow the statute to "be read as attempt-
ing to authorize liability to be enforced otherwise than through the verdict of a
jury in a court of common law." Fleitman v. Welsbach Co. (1916) 24o U. S.
27, 29, 36 Sup. Ct. 233, 234.
"Alexander v. Donohoe (1894) 143 N. Y. 203. 38 N. E. 263; Dana v. Morgan
(1916, C. C. A. 2d.) 232 Fed. 85; Goodbody v. Delaney (1912) 8o N. J. Eq. 417,
83 Atl. 988; Willoughby v. Chicago Jcn. Rys. Co., supra note 3; Hearst v. Putnam
Min. Co. (1904) 28 Utah, 184, 77 Pac. 753. Unless, of course, a decree adverse to
the company were entered by collusion. Alexander v. Donohoe, supra; Commis-
sioners of Sewers of the City of London v, Gellatly (1871) L. R. 3 Ch. 61o, 617
(opinion of Jessel, M. R.) ; Kerr v. Blodgett (871) 48 N. Y. 62.1 3Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald (1898) 157 N. Y. i66, 51 N. E. 997.
"'Endicott v. Marvel (0913, Ch.) 81 N. J. Eq. 378, 388, 87 At]. 230, 234;
affirmed (914) 83 N. J. Eq. 632, 92 Atl. 373.
T "The objection of laches of the individual stockholder goes to his right to
assert the property rights of the corporation; that right cannot be impaired by
the laches of another stockholder who may have joined in the bill." Endicott v.
Marvel. supra note 6, at p. 388 87 Atl. at p. 234.
"Hanna v. Lyon (19o4) 179 N. Y. 107, 71 N. E. 778.
'Holmes v. Camp (2927, Ist Dept.) 176 App. Div. 771, 162 N. Y. Supp. lOI4.
"Spring v. Webb (1915. D. Vt.) 227 Fed. 481.
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the salient feature which was first above noted. Representative it is,
because all the shareholders are interested in the company; but, first of
all, the suit is derivative. Its sole object is to redress an injury which
has been inflicted upon the corporation, as distinct from the stockholder,
although it goes without saying that the suit also lies to prevent a
threatened injury.2 ' But always, it will be observed, the injury, actual
or prospective, is to the corporation. The shareholder plaintiff responds,
indeed, to the call of his stock, but only as a part of the entity which is
injured. The damage to his stock is a matter of reflex action.
Primarily, the company feels the pain; it reaches the shareholders
through the stock as nerves, but it is the company that receives the blow.
Thus company A, owning stock in company B, may part with that asset,
and this, in the view of an A shareholder, may justify a stockholder's
suit to rescind the sale. In that suit the res is the B stock, not the A
stock, and it is the A company, not the B company, that is interested in
the outcome.22  When a corporation is authorized to increase its capital
stock, each of the present shareholders has the prior option, over the
public, of subscribing for a proportionate amount of the 
new issue ;23
but the infringement of that right does not justify a stockholder's suit,
for the grievance is individual, not corporate.
24  On the other hand, a
company may have a very lively interest in the title to its outstanding
shares, and yet its contentions may be adverse to those of the claimant;
as where it is sued either to compel it to recognize the plaintiff as the
rightful owner of shares, and as such, entitled to a transfer of record,
or for damages based on its refusal to make a transfer.
2 5 The cases, in
short, are of infinite variety where a suit by virtue of the ownership of
stock cannot be described as a stockholder's suit, if we are to use that
term accurately.
To stop with that assertion, however, does not give much in the way
of results. Fortunately, it is possible to mark heavier lines of definition.
At the outset, let us consider the nature of a business company, as it
appears to the shareholder. It is quite true that a corporation is
created by statutory law; but when we have said that, we have not told
all that there is to tell about its essential nature. After legislation has
"The injunctive method of relief in a stockholder's suit has become a common
method of testing the constitutionality of tax laws. The shareholder alleges that
the directors are about to pay taxes due under the law to which he objects; and,
on his application to enjoin this, the court passes on the constitutionality of the
law itself, allowing the Attorney General to be heard, by way of being amicus
curiae, in behalf of the government. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
(1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (income tax law of 1894); Brushaber v.
Union Pac. Ry. (1915) 24o U. S. I, 36 Sup. Ct. 236 (income tax law of 1913).
" Holmes v. Camp (1916) 219 N. Y. 359, 114 N. E. 841.
"Stokes v. Continental Trust Co. (i9o6) 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. io9o; Miles
v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 247, 42 Sup. Ct. 483.
' See Travis v. Knox Terpesone Co. (i915) 215 N. Y. 259, iog N. E. 250; Orvis
v. Lorraine Co. (ii8, 1st Dept.) 183 App. Div. I, !7o N. Y. Supp. 264.
"Waters v. Waters & Co. (19"1) 2oi N. Y. 184, 94 N. E. 6o.
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created the thing, it plays no part in life until people put money into it.
The statutes which forbid some classes of companies from doing busi-
ness until a certain part of their capital stock has been paid in, are but
precautionary expressions of this general idea. Except for purposes
of fraud, no company can be set going until it gets capital. This the
legislature does not furnish; on the contrary, the corporate heart is
made to beat through contributions which people make in exchange
for its stock and other securities. These contributions are the result of
agreement; the issue of stock is no matter of fiat from the State.
Agreements between people, or between people and the company, there-
fore, underlie the organization. And always these agreements have
the same object, that the company shall perform the functions for
which it was organized, that it shall do business, that it shall make
money. Whenever it fails in this regard, then the main desire of the
contributors is to get their money back again, or as much of it as may be
left. Thus to the shareholder the company assumes aspects varying
with its fortunes. At the start he asks whether the company was
organized in accordance with agreement, or were there departures from
the plan of financing which had been promulgated. Afterwards the
matters in which he has interest relate to the company as a going
concern. So long as it is doing business at a profit his money is in it to
stay, and so the gains and losses of the company are his own gains and
losses. But when the venture ceases to function on the lines intended,
then the shareholder's intention is, not only that further losses be
stopped, but that the business be wound up, and the remnant of his
capital contribution be restored to him.
This outline of what goes on in a shareholder's mind is not scientific;
it expresses no polished thought in law. But it will help us to follow
the boundaries of the stockholder's suit. For the courts have responded
to these ideas in shaping their remedies. And so we will be aided if
we keep in mind that the stockholder's rights regarding corporate
affairs vary with three situations; these having to do, respectively, with
pre-organization agreements, with the company as a going concern, and
with the corporate venture when viewed as a failure.
With the company as a going concern, the theory of the stockholder's
suit finds its ideal application. This is illustrated by the rule that, if the
act complained of constitutes a wrong to the corporation, then it can-
not also constitute a wrong to any individual stockholder.28 When one
puts his money into corporate stock, he invests in the activities of the
corporation as well as its property. His investment is inseparable from
the general mass, and when any corporate loss has been made good, the
stock regains its former relative value. Essentially his investment is in
a going concern. That is why, unless a statute allows otherwise, it
"Smith v. Hurd (1847, Mass.) 12 Metc. 371; Converse v. United Shoe Mach.
Co. supra note ii; Niles v. N. Y. Cent. & H6 R. R. (903) 176 N. Y. uig, 68
N. E. x42; Van Boskerck v. Aronson (1923, App. T.) x97 N. Y. Supp. 8og.
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requires the unanimous consent of the shareholders -for a company to
sell out its business, distribute the proceeds of the sale, and stop; and
that, too, even if the proceeds consist of the stock of another company
similarly caparisoned as to assets and liabilities.
2 7
To this rule, it is believed, there are no exceptions. The fact that
the majority of the stock can lawfully vote to sell the company's assets
when the business is losing money
2 is only an exception that proves the
rule. The directors by that method have saved the courts the trouble
of liquidating the company's affairs. Certainly it is no exception that
"stockholders of a holding company may maintain a representative
action for the benefit and in the behalf of the subsidiary company, the
directors of both companies having refused, after due request, to insti-
tute an action in the name of either company."
2' 9 That does not
seriously stretch the outlines of the stockholder's suit, as we have viewed
them. In fact the only .basis on which the shareholder can go directly
against the wrongdoer is that the latter owed the shareholder a special
Am. Seating Co. v. Bullard, supra note 12, and cases there cited; Jones v. Mo.
Edison Electric Co., supra note 12; Barnett v. Phila. Market Co. (19o7) 218 Pa.
649, 67 Atl. 912; Riker & Son Co. v. United Drug Co. (1912) 79 N. J. Eq. 58o,
82 Atl. 873; Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R. (1858) 30 Pa. St. 42. This is
illustrated by Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Co. (1919) 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct.
209. There the directors had sold the corporate property for what was alleged to
be an inaeequate price. The lower court had ordered a rescission on condition that
first the property be exposed for sale at public auction, and that the original sale
stand as made unless a bid were received higher than the price at which the direc-
tors had sold the property. But the Supreme Court reversed this decree on the
basis that the stockholders should not be put to any such test, if the condition of
the company did not warrant a sale at all.
I This doctrine, as announced in Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co. (856, Mass.)
7 Gray, 393, has been generally followed. O'Brien v. O'Brien (1923) 
245 Mass.
41, 141 N. E. 236; Geddes v. Anaconda Co., supra note 25; Marks v. Merrill
Paper Co. (1911, C. C. W. D. Wis.) 188 Fed. 850; Stebbins v. Michigan Wheel-
barrow & Truck Co. (igi, C. C. E. D. Mich.) 191 Fed. 238; Rhea v. Newton
(1919, C. C. A. 8th) 262 Fed. 345, cert. denied (192o) 254 U. S. 643, 41 Sup. Ct.
14; Heyden v. Hotel Co. (189o, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 42 Fed. 875; Jameson 
v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1897, ist Dept.) 14 App. Div. 380, 44 N. Y. Supp. 15;
Raymond v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co. (19o6, Ist Dept.) iii App. Div. 191,
97 N. Y. Supp. 557. A public service company, even when failing, probably has
not this right (Treadwell v. Salisbury Co., supra; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman
Palace Car Co. [18l] 139 U. S. 24, I1 Sup. Ct. 478) unless the sale is to the state
itself. Indianapolis v. Consumers Gas Co. (19o6, C. C. A. 7th) 144 Fed. 640.
Such a sale is justifiable because it saves the expense of condemnation, which,
according to the well settled rule, is merely a substitute for a sale. Atlanta,
K. & N. Ry. v. Southern Ry. (igo4, C. C. A. 6th) 131 Fd. 657; Randall v.
Texas Central Ry. (1885) 63 Tex. 586; United States v. Beatty (1912, W. D.
Va.) 198 Fed. 284; Burt v. Merchants Ins. Co. (1871) io6 Mass. 356; Kohl v.
United States (1875) 91 U. S. 367, 371. A private company, however, no matter
how prosperous, may quit business at any time if its shareholders all agree on that
course. Jacobs v. Morganthaler (19o7) 149 Mich- I, 112 N. W. 492.
"Holmes v. Camp (1917, 1st Dept.) i8o App. Div. 409, 411, 167 N. Y. Supp.
840, 841. See also Carter v. Producers' & Refiners' Oil Co. (1894) 164 
Pa. 463,
30 Atl. 391; European & North Am. Ry. v. Poor (1871) 59 Me. 277.
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duty. No director or officer owes this duty, simply by virtue of his
office; no, not even if he has personally promised the shareholder
faithfully to protect the interests of the company.3" The plaintiff must
show more than that; he must show a legal obligation owing him by the
defaulter, and having origin in circumstances which exclude the mere
fact that the plaintiff is a shareholder. Such instances can be found
in the books. We have that sort of case where the defendant was the
plaintiff's personal agent as well as the company's, and therefore bound
by the agency properly to manage everything in which the plaintiff
might have interest. Hence a holding company has a theoretical cause
of action against its own director when he, installed as manager of a
subsidiary, allows it to be ruined.3 ' And the same result will be
reached if the plaintiff, having hypothecated his stock with persons who
happen to be directors of the company, finds them conspiring to exhaust
its resources so as to depreciate the value of the stock, in the hope that,
the plaintiff being unable to obtain funds elsewhere for its redemption,
they will be able to buy it in on a foreclosure sale.3 2 In each of those
cases the plaintiff, in law, had his own grievance; and the corporate
grievance, however important a consideration in the assessment of
damages, was, so far as the cause of action might be concerned, a matter
of accident. But if there is no special tie of that sort between a
particular shareholder and the wrongdoer, the grievance is exclusively
corporate, so long as the corporation is a going concern.
Taking the stockholder's suit from this angle, the philosophy under-
lying it is apparent. The suit is derivative for a sound reason; and
its representative character is due to logic equally good.
The suit is derivative because the company is a separate entity, not
only for juristic reasons33 but because, as a going concern, the stock-
holders have recognized it as the person to whom their money has been
entrusted for handling. If its rights are invaded, it is the one to seek
redress. Nay more, if the company throws away its rights through
control exercised over its officers or governing board by people who
work in adverse interest, it may sue to recover whatever it may thus
have lost.3 4 In other words, it may go back on its own bargain. To
know why this is so, however, we cannot leave the case as it is put by
Noyes, J., that the company cannot "conspire that its own directors
" Van Boskerck v. Aronson, supra note 26. See also other cases there cited.
' General Rubber Co. v. Benedict (1915) 215 N. Y. 18, io9 N. E. 96.
' Ritchie v. McMullen (1897, C. C. A. 6th) 79 Fed. 522.
'See Canfield, Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory (1917) 17
COL. L. RFv. 128.
"Medlin Milling Co. v. Moffat Conn. Co. (1915, W. D. Mo.) 218 Fed. 686;
Loan Soc. of Phila. v. Eavenson (1913) 241 Pa. 65, 88 Atl. 295; Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. McCurdy (i9o7, ist Dept) 118 App. Div. 822, io3 N. Y. Supp. 840;
Asphalt Constru. Co. v. Bouker (1912, Ist Dept.) i5o App. Div. 691, 135 N. Y.
Supp. 714; affrmed (1914) 2io N..Y. 643, 105 N. E. 1O8O; Corey v. Indep. Ice
Co. (1917) 226 Mass. 391, 115 N. E. 312.
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"shall be unfaithful to it,"35 because, in and of themselves, these words
merely describe a result of reasoning. But we are given the underlying
thought if we recall that this language reflects the well-known rule that
a trustee, who has parted with trust funds in violation of the trust,
nevertheless may sue to recover them, and, when he succeeds, holds the
recaptured assets on the same trusts as before.386 The reason is that
the wrongdoer is not to be conceded the power to destroy the trust.
With the restoration of the thing taken, the trust must be resumed, and
therefore the trustee is the man to hold the title, at least until such time
as the court can remove him and appoint a successor.3 7  By the same
token, a corporation should not go out of business simply because it
has been robbed; the logical thing to do is to restore to it that which it
has lost, and let it resume its course. It is only when the trustee
refuses to sue, or the corporation is so under enemy control that its
proper consent to sue cannot be obtained,-for naturally a stockholder
cannot use its name, even in a suit in its own behalf, without proper
authority,3 8 -that the court allows the beneficiary in the one case, or
the stockholder in the other, to sue in the right of the trustee or of the
corporation.
This reasoning involves the conclusion that, despite a contrary sug-
gestion which occasionally comes from eminent sources
9 there is no
difference, in the right of relief, between a shareholder's suit and a suit
by the corporation. The suggestion is that the corporation cannot sue
because it cannot uproot a transaction to which it has consented,
whereas a minority stockholder, who has not shared in the combined
action of the majority which led to the corporate consent being given, is
not estopped and can obtain that relief for the corporation to which it
would not be entitled should it sue for itself. The error of this thought
lies in what it overlooks. On the surface, it disregards the derivative
nature of the stockholder's suit, with the necessary conclusion that the
shareholder cannot sue if the corporation itself had no cause of action.
What it overlooks at the bottom is that a company organized for busi-
ness holds, in ultimate analysis, its assets and goodwill as in dedica-
tion to the real purpose of its being, which is to do business at a profit,
and, to that end, it can lawfully do nothing that honest judgment would
Pa. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Am?. Sugar Ref. Co. (io8, C. C. A. 2d) 166 Fed. 254;
261.
Wetnore v. Porter (1883) 92 N. Y. 76; Zimmerman v. Kinkle (1888) io8
N. Y. 282, I5 N. E. 4o7; First National Bank of Paterson v. National B'way Bank
(1898) 156 N. Y. 459, 51 N. E. 398; Ludington v. Mercantile National Bank (19o5,
2d Dept.) 3O2 App. Div. 251, 92 N. Y. Supp. 454.
' See Stone, Nature of the Rights of a Cestui que Trust (1917) 17 CoL. L. Rav.
467.
.Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co. (I939, C. C. A. 6th) 261 Fed. 15;
cert. denied (1920) 251 U. S. 558, 40 Sup. Ct. 179.
'Even from Hough, J. See his obiter remarks in Ransoine Concrete Mach. Co.
v. Moody (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 282 Fed. 29, 34.
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refuse to sanction. In that regard, as we have seen, there is no differ-
ence between a trustee and a corporation. If the trustee has wrongfully
parted with trust funds, he may sue to recover them; and so with the
corporation. Of course, if all of the trustee's beneficiaries agree with
what he has done, he cannot recover, because the effect of a favorable
decree would be to reconstitute the trust in behalf of people who had
agreed otherwise,--and consequently, unless a statute forbids, a trust
may be destroyed by the beneficiaries all agreeing that the trustee may
transfer the assets.40 In like manner the agreement of all its share-
holders will justify a corporation in making any dispositien of its assets
that does not defraud its creditors or evade any duty it may owe the
public.4 ' But, so long as there is one beneficiary who has not agreed,
!he trustee's suit will result in the diverted assets being restored to the
trust. So with the corporation. There are, of course, things of which
the majority may lawfully approve, and the corporate acts thus involved
bind the company in all respects. But to cite such a case is to beg the
question, for corporate conduct of that sort is within the terms of the
trust, and so the minority have no right to say that the company has
been injured. But when we find a corporate act which is outside the
scope and purpose of the company's course of affairs as rightfully
to be conducted, then, unless all the shareholders have agreed that this is
what they wanted the company to do, the corporate trust has received
injury, and the corporation is the party to right the wrong. It is
because the company could have sued that a derivative suit lies at the
instance of a shareholder. Naturally, if he personally has given his
approval of what has been done, the court will not hear him. But it
does not follow that the company has no grievance; the court's only
thought is that, even in a representative suit, the representative must at
least be as clean as he would like his principal to be.
That is why in this class of cases there is ordinarily no need for the
appointment of a receiver. The most that is ever done is to appoint a
receiver until final decree, and then only if a case of waste pendente lite
is shown. Nor is such a receiver required by the final decree to do
more than turn over the assets to the corporation, for in its nature the
suit would not, in the usual circumstances, require more than that sort
of relief. It is only when the robbery has so injured the company as
to involve a stoppage of its business that this sort of case can be
turned into one of liquidation, requiring a distribution of the recovered
funds by the court, through the medium of a receiver, among the parties
ultimately .in interest.4 2 But then the receivership would be of quite
a different nature; for a stopped company usually passes into the hands
"Parker v. Converse (1855, Mass.) 5 Gray, 336; Newman v. Newman (1885)
L. R. 28 Ch. Div. 674. For the rule in such a state as New York, where legisla-
tion has intervened, see Matter of Wentworth (1920) 230 N. Y. 176, 129 N. E. 646.
'J acobs v. Mergenthaler, supra note 28.
' Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld (1912) 225 U. S. 445, 32 Sup. Ct. 728.
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of a liquidating receiver at the outset, and it is he who, in the corporate
right, brings the suit to recover stolen assets.
It is now in order to discuss an equity principle which was touched
earlier in this essay, but laid aside for the time being. For that princi-
ple, it is believed, will aid our understanding in several ways. As
showing the distinctions applicable to the stockholder's suit, between
the case of the going concern and the case of the pre-organization
agreement, and between both and the case of the insolvent company,
this rule of equity has great value.
To appreciate the rule we must recur to a feature of the stockholder's
suit that was cited at the outset. The suit as was then noted, is always
representative.
It does not usually happen that the shareholder who sues is the only
party in similar interest. Of course, with two-men companies the
necessity for this form of action is technical at best,-in reality the
quarrel is between two equal interests, and therefore slips in forms of
pleading or practice are not seriously regarded.4 3  But in the usual case
where we have a number of shareholders, the plaintiff, while suing in the
right of the corporation, represents the other shareholders just as much
as himself. Hence these people, while not properly to be made defen-
dants, inasmuch as their interest lies on the opposite side,4 should have
the right to intervene; and, because of that, they should be bound by
any non-collusive judgment which has disposed of the case on the
merits.
In that respect the case is the same as any other where a number
of people are interested in a common fund. Interference with that
fund injures all, and a representative suit lies in behalf of all. "Here,"
said an English judge in an early case, "is a fund in which, all the
shareholders are interested; I5,OOO 1. has been improperly taken out
of it: a fraud has been committed on them all. Is it necessary that all
should come into a court of justice, for the purpose of joining in a suit
with a view to obtain redress? .... .In the present case, it appears to
me that justice may be done in one suit. All the shareholders stand
in the same situation; the property has been taken out of their common
fund; they are entitled to have that property bought back again for the
benefit of the concern. When all parties stand in the same situation,
and have one common right and one common interest, in what respect
'E. g. Kreitner v. Bergweger (ii6, 4th Dept.) 174 App. Div. 48, 16o N. Y_
Supp. 256; Fish v. Harrison (1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 533, 91 Atl. 325; (1917) IOO At.
185; Barnes v. All-American Invest. Co. (923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 120 Misc. 706.
" "It would have been proper enough for the plaintiff, suing in his own name
and in behalf of the other stockholders, to bring an action against McClanahan
and to join with him the directors, whose negligent administration made McClana-
han's alleged misconduct possible. In such a case it would have been open to
any, or all, of the other stockholders to intervene in the action, as they might
feel disposed, or be advised. But that they should be brought in as parties defen-
dant is, certainly, without excuse on the face of 'the complaint." McCrea v.
Robertson, supra note 4, at p. 154, 84 N. E. at p. 462.
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can it be inconvenient that two, or three or more, should sue in their
own names for the benefit of all?"45 The case, in short, is precisely
similar to that of a mortgage securing bonds, where the bondholders are
numerous, and the trustee under the mortgage refuses to act;46 of
legatees or beneficiaries where the executor or trustee will not sue ;7
also, it parallels the creditors' bill for distribution of the estate of a
decedent or of an insolvent corporation. 8 There is a limited fund, in
the shape of the corporation's assets and good-will, including its rights
against those who have wronged it or are about to do so; and the
parties interested in it are numerous. This, according to the rule every-
where, gives the right to a representative action.
But unless the subject of the suit be a limited fund, no representative
action will lie. That, at least in this country, is well settled.4 9  And so
the shareholder's suit must relate solely to this fund and its protection;
otherwise it will be dismissed. This is shown by the case of a corporate
lease with the lessee covenanting to pay rent directly to the lessor's
shareholders. That agreement is made for their direct benefit; and,
at least in States allowing suit on a contract by a beneficiary to it, a
separate suit would lie in behalf of each shareholder. But, as the
agreement is not a corporate asset, the suit should not be derivative,
because it does not sound in behalf of the corporation.5 0  To that
doctrine the writer subscribes in spite of the rule of expediency which
the Federal courts recently have adopted, that in such cases the lessor
company is taxable upon the total of the rentals as corporate income.5 1
With these thoughts in mind, we can turn from the corporation as a
'Hichens v. Congreve (1828, Ch.) 4 Russ. 562, 575-7.
'Re Chickering (1883) 56 Vt. 82; Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Longacre Co.
(1918) 223 N. Y. 69, 119 N. E. 233; Colo. & S. Ry. v. Blair (1915) 214 N. Y.
497, io8 N. E. 840; Kerrison v. Stewart (1876) 93 U. S. 135; Beals v. Ill. M. &
T. Ry. (189o) 133 U. S. 290, 10 Sup. Ct. 314.
'McQuaide v. Perot (ii8) 223 N. Y. 75, 119 N. E. 230; Bump v. Gilchrist
(1889, Sup. Ct.) 52 Hun, 6, 4 N. Y. Supp. 737; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe (igi6,
C. C. A. 4th) 230 Fed. 781; Haverneyer v. Brooklyn Sugar Ref. Co. (i89o, Sup.
Ct) 26 Abb. N. C. 157, 13 N. Y. Supp. 873.
" The likeness between the creditor's suit and the stockholder's bill has often
been noted. Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald, supra note 15; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick
(i885) 99 N. Y. 185, I N. E. 663; Markt & Co. v. Knight S. S. Co. Ltd. Eigio,
C. A.] 2 K. B. 1O21, iO44 f (opinion of Buckley, L. J.).
SBouton v. Van Buren (192o) 229 N. Y. 17, 127 N. E. 477; Bauer v. Dewey.
(i9oi) 166 N. Y. 402, 6o N. E. 30. In England the rule is more lax. See Markt
& Co. v. Knight S. S. Co. Ltd., supra note 48.
'Beveridge v. N. Y. El. Ry. Co. (1889) 112 N. Y. i, ig N. E. 489; Bowers v.
Interborough R. T. Co. (1923, Spec. T.) 121 Misc. 250, 2o N. Y. Supp. 198;
Peabody v. Interborough R. T. Co. (1923, Spec. T.) 121 Misc. 647.
'Blalock v. Ga. Ry. & Electric Co. (1917, C. C. A. 5th) 246 Fed. 387; West
End Street Ry. v. Malley (1917, C. C. A. Ist) 246 Fed. 625; cert. denied (1918)
246 U. S. 671, 38 Sup. Ct. 423; Rensselaer & S. R. R. v. Irwin (igi8, C. C. A. 2d)
249 Fed. 726; cert. denied (ii8) 246 U. S. 671, 38 Sup. Ct. 424; Northern R. R.
of N. I. v. Lowe (ii8, C. C. A. 2d) 250 Fed. 856.
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going concern to the cases that deal with pre-organization agreements.
And when we test these cases by the ideas underlying the derivative and
the representative features of the stockholder's suit, we are able to
understand why, concerning these cases, this form of relief has a very
restricted field.
If the plaintiff is one of those who agree that the company shall be
organized, his agreement presupposes, as a general thing, that the
company will be financed in the method for which the agreement
provides; and it is not until then that his agreement becomes enforci-
ble,-enforcible generally speaking, at the suit of the company. 52  If the
company, being entitled to enforce this contract, refuses to do so as
against any particular person, then, indeed, we have a case for the stock-
holder's bill. But if the plaintiff wishes to avoid his bargain because of
such things as the fraud of the promoters of the undertaking, the action
that he takes, whatever it may be, is individual and not representative,
and his grievance is personal, not derivative. And it goes the same
way, naturally, if, instead of asserting or seeking rescission, he sues for
damages in an action of deceit.53  These cases, in short, deal with such
questions as, how the plaintiff got the stock, and whether he must abide
by his bargain; whereas his rights on the stock itself are necessarily to
be postponed to a determination of such matters in limine. There can
be no stockholder's suit, as such, in connection with these points.
""Agreements to subscribe for the stock of a corporation to be formed
presuppose the organization of the corporation before they become binding and
enforceable. It may not be that the subscriptions must be full and complete before
the contract of a subscriber can be enforced, but the corporation when formed is
generally the party to enforce the agreement. (Marysville Electric Light &
Power Co. v. Johnson, 93 Calif. 538; Ashuelot Boot & Shoe Co. v. Hoit, 56 N. H.
548; Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471; International Fair & Exposi-
tion Assoc of Detroit v. Walker, 83 Mich. 386.)" Jermyn v. Searing (1919) 225
N. Y. 525, 538, 122 N. E. 706, 709. Cf. Avon Springs San. Co. v. Weed (1907,
4th Dept.) 119 App. Div. 56o, 1O4 N. Y. Supp 58, reversed (on dissenting opinion
below) (197o) 189 N. Y. 557, 82 N. E. 1123; Morgan v. Bon Bon Co. (1917) 222
N. Y. 22, 118 N. E. 205; Galloghy v. Whitmore (1916, 3d Dept.) 172 App. Div.
381, 158 N. Y. Supp. 83o.
'Damages :-Brewster v. Hatch (18go) 122 N. Y. 341, 25 N. E. 505; Sire v.
Edenborn (1916) 242 U. S. 131, 37 Sup. Ct. 36; Churchill v. St. George Devel. Co.
(1916, 4th Dept.) 174 App. Div. I, 16o N. Y. Supp. 357; damages for breach of
agreement to keep company supplied with funds, Higgins v. Applebaum (19i, Ist
Dept.) 186 App. Div. 682, 174 N. Y. Supp. 8o7. Rescission:-Getty v. Devlin
(1873) 54 N. Y. 403; Alder v. Edenborn (1916) 242 U. S. 137, 37 Sup. Ct. 38;
Heckscher v. Edenborn (1911) 2o3 N. Y. 210, 96 N. E. 44i; .Virginia Land Co. v.
Haupt (1894) 9o Va. 533, i S. E. 168; Re Metropolitan Coal Consumers Assoc.
(1892, C. A.) 66 L. T. 700; Sir v. Edenborn., supra; King v. Barnes (1888) io9
N. Y. 267, 16 N. E. 332. But the rescission must be logical. If it is against the
company, which has sold the plaintiff partly paid shares as fully paid, he cannot
keep the shares and sue for damages. His only recourse is to rescind. If he keeps
the shares, he must pay the calls. Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank (188o,
H. L.) 5 A. C. 317; Re Addlestone Co. (1887, C. A.) L. R. 37 Ch. Div. i91. See
also Stephany v. Marsden (91o) 76 N. J. Eq. 611, 75 Ati. 899.
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More or less, the same observations apply to matters connected with
corporate death. The emphasis of that term is not limited by strictly
legal conceptions. A corporation dies, from one point of view, only
when its charter expires by limitation or forfeiture, or it is dissolved by
statutory proceedings; for neither bankruptcy nor an equity receiver-
ship can destroy corporate life. But the working of corporate affairs
in the sight of the courts has resulted in a practical as well as a
theoretical conception of corporate death. A company for all practical
purposes can be killed through the act of its directors, wrongful though
that act may be, and incapable of effecting a corporate dissolution.
And the consequence of interest to us is that corporate death, however
caused, has its effects on the stockholder's suit in its range of
application.
Let us first consider the death which is caused by the wrongful act
of the directors. They, we will say, decide to sell the assets, including
goodwill. We may have a case where it is quite proper for the direc-
tors to sell all the assets, provided they reserve the goodwill, because
the business of the company is of such a nature that its profits are made
in just that way. In cases of that sort the company continues in busi-
ness with the proceeds of its sale, and gets ready, indeed, for another
turnover of the like kind. Nobody can complain of that.54 But it is
different when goodwill is sold as well as assets, for that means that the
corporation is to quit business, and converts the shareholder's interest
into something quite different from that which he had in a going
concern. To appraise his right of action requires a survey of the
situation as it actually existed.
If the stockholder can so untangle the coil as to restore his company
to its former position by a suit in the way of rescission, then obviously
he must sue in the name of his company; it must be a true stockholder's
suit. But the court may find that rescission is impossible. In that
event the shareholder's right is just as personal as it was concerning the
agreements which led to the formation of the company. Undoubtedly
he is entitled at law to damages; and the most that equity can give him
is a lien on the old assets, if still in the hands of the buyer, for the value
of his stock. But while on final hearing the court is in a position to
know what it can do for the stockholder, the latter is not endowed with
any such knowledge at the outset. His position at that time is difficult,
for he knows but little of the facts, especially of the buyer's acts subse-
quent to the purchase; and he cannot then ascertain whether rescission
would be possible. These reasons have led to the courts allowing an
amorphous action, which is always representative. It also professes to
be derivative; but at the trial the plaintiffs are allowed to resolve their
suit into either a true stockholder's bill for rescission or a personal suit,
according to the relief which the court finds itself able to give. The
'Freeman v. Sea View Hotel Co. (1898) 57 N. J. Eq. 68, 40 Atl. 218; Butler v.
New Keystone Copper Co. (1915, Del. Ch.) 93 Atl. 380.
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relief, in short, varies according to whether the old company can be set
on its legs again. If so, the transaction is rescinded, the company's
assets are returned to it, and the plaintiffs take nothing personally by
their suit. But if rescission cannot be had, the plaintiffs are given the
next best thing; they are allowed the value of their shares, and their
recovery is enforced by the decree impressing the assets of the old
company, so far as they can be located as still in the wrongdoer's hands,
with a lien to that extent.55 This suit, therefore, is justifiably deriva-
tive, and properly representative. If the court can restore to the old
company its property. that will be done. If not, then its shareholders
go against a common fund in the shape of the corporate assets. It is
only when both methods of relief fail that a simple money decree is
given them. But the essential nature of the grievance being both
derivative and representative, the court is justified in retaining the
cause for such decree as it finds itself able to give. It cannot lose
jurisdiction because the wrongdoer has made impossible the full measure
of relief to which the nature of the case entitled the plaintiff on the filing
of his bill.
The cases just discussed involved something additional to a mere
sale of the corporate assets. What the wrongdoing directors proposed
was a distribution among the shareholders of the net proceeds of the
sale, after payment of corporate debts. They purposed, in short, a
liquidation of the company's affairs. The minority shareholders
protested against a liquidation of the kind offered, and the courts upheld
them. But there are cases, of course, where liquidation occurs without
valid objection. It remains for us to speak of these different sorts of
winding up in so far as they bear upon the-topic under review.
It would not be possible, with any decent regard for the amenities
relating to time and space, to do more than enumerate the different
forms of corporate liquidation. A company may make a general
assignment for the benefit of its creditors. It may be adjudged a
bankrupt. It may be dissolved under statutory proceedings instituted
in the courts of the state by virtue of whose laws it was created. Under
other provisions of those same laws it may dissolve itself without judi-
cial aid. Its affairs may be wound up by a court of equity on the bill
"Jones v. Mo. Edison Co., supra note 12; Am. Seating Co. v. Bullard, supra
note 12; and cases there cited; O'Brien v. O'Brien, supra note 28; Southern Pac.
Ry. v. Bogert (1918) 250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533. "Now, as the court may
under this prayer rehabilitate the Edison Corporation, it may do less. It may
grant a decree nisi, a decree that all its property, powers and franchises be restored
to the Edison Company unless within a time certain the defendants pay to the
complainant and those who join him the value of their share of the property trans-
ferred to the Consolidated Company. Such a decree would be consistent with the
repudiation of the contract of consolidation and with the first prayer in the bill."
Jones v. Mo. Edison Co., supra note 12, at p. 779. If, as part of the scheme, a
legal dissolution of the company has been effected, the action, while representative,
cannot be considered as strictly derivative. See O'Brien v. O'Brien (1921) 238
Mass. 403, 131 N. E. 177.
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of a shareholder, or-to take the more common case-on the bill of a
creditor for general administration. There are cases where, as we have
seen, its directors lawfully may sell the assets and distribute the
proceeds. Again, corporations engaged in certain lines of business, as
banks and insurance companies, are, under the laws of many states, so
subject to state control that an administrative officer may by fiat shut
the doors and wind up the corporate affairs. National banks, also, are
under this sort of subjection to the Comptroller of the Currency. For
present purposes we can stop with the catalogue thus presented if we
draw from it one or two simple thoughts.
All forms of winding up result in the creation of a liquidator, in
whom are vested the functions necessary to gather in the assets for the
purpose of distribution. There is, however, as to liquidators a distinc-
tion in terms of office. The officer in the one case may be a receiver,
in another we find the liquidator in the person of the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, and in other cases the statute may delegate the duty in the first
instance to the board of directors. But these diversities do not prevent
classification, and the intentions of this essay will be fully served if we
separate liquidators into but two classes. The one comprises those
officers who, judicially appointed at the outset, act in all things under
judicial direction. That sort of officer, in effect, is really a sub-agent;
the court itself, in ultimate analysis, being the real liquidator. Of such
are receivers when judicially appointed, and trustees in bankruptcy.
The other class includes those liquidators who are not immediately
subject to judicial control. In that category, therefore, we find direc-
tors, liquidators appointed by such an administrative officer as a Super-
intendent of Banks, and assignees under a general assignment.
The usefulness of this method of indexing becomes apparent when
the liquidator finds that, prior to the passage of the company's affairs
into his hands, something had occurred that inflicted injury on the
company, something for which a stockholder's bill would have lain had
the company refused to act. But, as the company has died for all
practical purposes, it follows that the liquidator is the one to bring
the necessary suit. And if he refuses to act, then, in accordance with
the principles we have considered, the shareholder should find himself
vested with a derivative cause of action,-not in behalf of the company,
indeed, but of the liquidator. But it is just there that the distinction
applies regarding the different kinds of liquidators.
If the liquidator is appointed by the company, or even by a statutory
authority acting in such cases, as the State Superintendent of Banks,
then the suit may be brought without further ado.-6 The liquidator is
a necessary party defendant; and so, too, is the company, if it is still
"Holmes v. Camp (1919, ist Dept.) 186 App. Div. 675, 175 N. Y. Supp. 349,
affrned (1919) 227 N. Y. 635, 126 N. E. 91o; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, supra
note 48; Ackerman v. Halsey (1886) 37 N. J. Eq. 356; Smith v. Swormstedt
(1853, U. S.) I6 How. 288; Bacon v. Robertson (1855, U. S.) 18 How. 48o.
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alive, and the liquidation is being conducted in its name.5 7 But if the
liquidator is a judicial officer, such as a receiver, or a trustee in bank-
ruptcy, then sound reason requires that suit should lie only by him,
recourse to the court being proper to compel him to sue if he wilfully
refuses.5 s For when a liquidating court takes control, the corporate
assets are then in court, the officer being merely its arm, and it is a
perversion of reason to allow any suit to be brought that will not draw
the proceeds directly into the court. With a judicial liquidation, then,
the stockholder's action ceases to have place; for there is no need of it,
an universal representative being on the scene in the shape of the court
and its officer.
In the course of this article many things have been said that tempt to
further discussion. Other pleasant topics, indeed, have been passed
without mention, such as the difference between the rules prevailing in
the Federal courts and those of certain States, as to allowing a stock-
holder's suit to be brought by one who bought his stock after the
company had suffered the injury in question. 9 And in the setting
down of these thoughts many more would suggest themselves. But
enough has been said to develop what the writer believes to be the
principal features of the form of action under discussion. And, his
duty in that regard having been done as he conceived it, it is impera-
tive that he stop. For, such are the fascinations of our law to any
one who undertakes to write concerning it, that the hardest part of the
work is, having chosen a path, to walk it straightly.
"Harris-Woodbury Lumber Co. v. Coffin (191o, C. C. W. D. N. C.) 179 Fed.
257; Camp v. Taylor (189o, N. J. Ch.) 19 Atl. 968; Security Tr. Co. v. Pritchard
(192r, Spec. T.) i9o N. Y. Supp. 871.
' Klein v. Peter (1922, C. C. A. 8th) 284 Fed. 797; Klein v. Peter (1923,
C. C. A. 9th) 286 Fed. 362; contra: Farwell v. Great Western Tel. Co. (1896)
161 Ill. 422, 44 N. E. 891.
"For a discussion of these different rules see Pollitz v. Gould (1911) 202 N. Y.
11, 94 N. E. io88. This, it will be noted, has nothing to do with the question
whether the plaintiff should be precluded by reason of his assignor having ratified
the transaction before he parted with his stock See Babcock v. Farwell (igio)
245 Ill. 14, 9i N. E. 683.
